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The Bobsled Controversy and 
Squaw Valley’s Olympic Winter Games
Wanda Wakefi eld — USA
On February 15, 1959, Art Tyler piloted a four-man bobsled team from the United States to a World Championship at St. Moritz.1 Yet even as Tyler, the 1956 Olympic bronze medalist,2 celebrated his great victory with his teammates, he and they must surely have lamented the 
serious blow that the American bobsled program – and indeed the whole of sliding sports – had already 
suffered due to the decision by the Organizing Committee for the 1960 Olympic Winter Games at 
Squaw Valley not to build a bobsled run. Despite the promises proponents of the Squaw Valley Games 
made in 1955 to provide competition in each of the four major winter sports,3 in September, 1957, orga-
nizers asked for, and received, permission from the International Olympic Committee to abandon their 
plans to build a run. In doing so they set back the development of the sliding sports in the United States 
by two decades, and failed to take advantage of a growing desire by budding athletes to explore new 
sports. As John Morgan, Executive Producer for FIBT-TV, recently explained, “[having a bobsled track 
in California would have] launched the sport to those crazy Californians who were then surfi ng along 
with inventing skateboarding and in general, the fi rst of extreme sports themes.”4
That the sport of bobsled in the United States was specifi cally damaged by the failure to construct a 
new track in California for 1960, can be demonstrated by examining the American sliders’ results in the 
years before the Squaw Valley Games and after. For example, bobsledders from the United States had 
medaled numerous times in previous Olympics, including the 1956 Games at Cortina d’Ampezzo. No 
American bobsledders would win Olympic medals again until the 2002 Olympic Winter Games at Salt 
Lake City. Moreover, after the 1961 World Bobsled Championships, held at Lake Placid, only three other 
American bobsled teams would win medals in international competition again until 1996. That lack of 
international success cannot, of course, be attributed solely to the fact that no bobsled run was built on 
the West Coast. Bobsled and other sports, such as the sliding sport of luge, were also disadvantaged in 
international competition by the lack of fi nancial and practical support from their American governing 
body, the AAU. Indeed, the lack of success of American athletes due to ongoing feuds between the 
NCAA and AAU over control of sports in the United States ultimately led to the enactment of the Ama-
teur Sports Act of 1978, which required each individual sport to have its own, governing body.5
In any event, the international bobsledding community protested the Squaw Valley decision in the 
strongest possible terms, and in a variety of venues, and fought for a year to have bobsled competitions 
restored to the 1960 Olympic program. Then, when that failed, they supported the effort by the village 
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of Lake Placid, which had a working bobsled run dating from the 1932 Olympics, to move the bobsled 
races to New York state. The IOC also rejected that idea and bobsledders remain bitter about the 1960 
situation to this day.6 
In 1957, the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee (SVOC) asked to eliminate bobsled due to what 
it said was the expense of construction and the likelihood that too few nations would enter sleds in the 
competition to justify the cost. The International Olympic Committee, headed by its President, Avery 
Brundage, and Chancellor, Otto Mayer, clearly accepted these arguments. They also, in the years be-
tween 1957 and 1960, refused to entertain ideas for alternative venues in which the competitions might 
have been held. Why did they do so? Was there something specifi c about bobsled that earned their 
scorn? Was there something about the winter sports in general to which Brundage and Mayer objected? 
And would the decision to eliminate bobsled races at the 1960 Olympic Winter Games have been dif-
ferent if the bob run had been another fi eld on which to fi ght the Cold War? The purpose of this paper 
is to suggest answers to these questions.
In the spring of 1955, Squaw Valley was awarded the 1960 Olympic Winter Games by a 32-30 vote 
over a strong bid from Innsbruck, Austria.7 At that time, the SVOC pledged that they would be able to 
build up their proposed venue from a “picnic ground” to a world-class sports destination, which would 
provide facilities for the four major winter sports on time and within their proposed budget.8 In later 
years, bobsled supporters involved with the IOC would argue that they would never have supported 
the California bid without the assurance that sliding would be included on the program. And, indeed, 
at fi rst no one had any reason to doubt that that would be so. On October 4, 1955, Alexander Cushing, 
who shortly would be forced out of his position as head of the Squaw Valley organizing committee, 
advised IOC President Brundage that preliminary plans for the bobsled track had already been approved 
by the Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et Tobagganing (FIBT).9 And at the end of the year, in 
an article in the Nevada State-Journal describing the state of Olympic Planning, IOC Chancellor Otto 
Mayer explained that the French designer, Louis Saint-Cailbre had been contacted to draw up plans for 
the bobsled track.10
The following year most of those interested in the sliding sports would have continued to believe that 
they were going to have an opportunity for world-class competition at Squaw Valley. On February 3, 
1956, Avery Brundage wrote to Count Rene de Fregeoliere, President of the International Bobsled Fed-
eration, about various technical specifi cations for the bob run.11 Meanwhile, the new head of the Squaw 
Valley committee, Prentis Hale, advised Otto Mayer that Saint-Cailbre was proceeding with his designs.12 
Finally, in October, 1956, both Count de Fregeoliere and Albert Mayer, Vice President of the FIBT, were 
invited to join the leaders of other international sports organizations to tour the Squaw Valley site.13
The following year Squaw Valley planners continued to prepare for bobsled competitions. With re-
gard to the dates for the 1960 Olympic Winter Games, Alan Bartholemy, Secretary of the SVOC, wrote 
to Marc Hodler of the FIS, that starting later in February, 1960 would be better for the proposed refrig-
erated bob track.14 And, on March 19, 1957, apparently anticipating no change in plans, Otto Mayer 
assured Bartholemy that representatives from Squaw Valley did not need to attend the upcoming IOC 
meetings in Sofi a, Bulgaria.15
Nevertheless, there are indications that bobsled was already being considered for elimination from 
the program by the IOC. In 1954, the IOC voted to replace skeleton (which had been contested only 
at St. Moritz) with luge as an Olympic sport. Luge then split from FIBT with the establishment of a new 
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governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Luge de Course (FIL).16 Apparently, Otto Mayer and 
Avery Brundage began to wonder about the inclusion of luge in the 1960 program almost immediately 
thereafter. In a series of letters from Mayer to Brundage in April, 1957, Mayer described the large num-
ber of Europeans participating in luge, emphasized the amateur status of those athletes and suggested 
the addition of luge.17 Although, in those letters, Mayer never suggested that bobsled be replaced by 
luge, his emphasis on the large number of competitive luge athletes must surely have been intended 
to catch Brundage’s attention, as during the subsequent fi ght with bobsled over its exclusion from the 
Olympic program, Brundage consistently argued that there were simply too few bobsledders in the 
world to justify the sport’s continuation as an Olympic sport. 
On June 17, 1957, Otto Mayer contacted Alan Bartholmey, and, despite his earlier advice, now 
urged that Bartholemy or another Squaw Valley representative make the trip to Sofi a.18 Bartholemy 
responded that there was no money in the budget for such a trip. Two weeks later, on July 1, 1957 Bar-
tholemy provided the proposed 1960 competition schedule to Count de Fregeolière.19 As of August 13, 
1957, a tentative program for Squaw Valley also included the dates for bobsled racing. 
Then, with no apparent advance notice,20 during the IOC meetings at Sofi a from September 23 
to September 28, the Squaw Valley committee received the IOC’s permission to abandon their plans 
to build a bobsled run. The minutes of that Sofi a meeting show that the IOC considered a number of 
matters relevant to the upcoming Olympic Winter Games. They gave provisional permission to partici-
pation by athletes from North Korea, so long as they competed as part of a joint Korean team – a plan 
similar to that followed with regard to German Olympic athletes who competed as part of a unifi ed 
team until 1968.21 The IOC also accepted the promise by the United States government that athletes and 
offi cials from every nation would be admitted to the country in February, 1960, even if they represented 
a country with which the United States had no diplomatic relations. Furthermore, those athletes and 
offi cials would be exempted from any fi ngerprinting requirements.22
The IOC members then proceeded to consider the elimination or addition of sports in future Olym-
pic games. They accepted the request by the Italian Olympic Committee to eliminate running deer from 
shooting competitions for the Summer Games scheduled for Rome in 1960. And “on the recommenda-
tion of the Organizing Committee and in agreement with Mr. Albert Mayer, Vice-President of the Bob-
sleigh International Federation” they decided to exclude bobsled while reserving the right to reconsider 
the matter should 12 national federations advise the Olympic organizers that they would like to race at 
Squaw Valley.23 
 During the discussion about eliminating certain sports, Avery Brundage explained his own feelings 
about the matter. According to Brundage, since sports such as football, cycling, basketball and water 
polo did not follow the rules of amateurism they should be removed from the summer games. Similarly, 
in his view, fi gure skating was irreparably tarnished with professionalism and should be eliminated. 
Brundage also said that a sport that has been consistently mismanaged should be considered for elimi-
nation. Signifi cantly, at Sofi a, in explaining why he believed certain sports should be removed from the 
Olympic program, and immediately following the decision to exclude bobsled, Brundage did not cite 
the reasons for not providing a bobsled competition – that building the track would be too expensive, 
and that few countries proposed to send sleds – in explaining why he believed certain sports should be 
taken off the Olympic program.24
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In subsequent months, representatives of the FIBT, trying to restore the bobsled competition, strug-
gled to counter the constantly shifting justifi cations for the Sofi a decision, while responding to Brund-
age’s concerns about professionalism and mismanagement in Olympic sports. 
When the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee approached the IOC in September, 1957, asking 
that their obligation to build a bobsled track be waived, they cited the results of a survey allegedly sent 
to the National Olympic committees of those countries in the past, which had participated in bobsled 
competitions. They reported to the IOC that of those countries surveyed, only two, the United States 
and Romania, had said that they would defi nitely participate in 1960.25 Almost immediately representa-
tives of bobsledding interests in various European nations began to counter the idea that they were not 
planning to send sleds to the Olympics. As Otto Mayer reported to Prentis Hale in October, the Italian, 
Swiss and German Olympic committees were all quite angry at the decision.26 Moreover, on October 9, 
1957, Giordano B. Fabjan, of the Italian Olympic Committee wrote to Prentis Hale that Italy had totally 
misunderstood the signifi cance of the survey – which he admitted they had received. Fabjan asserted 
that in responding to the Squaw Valley questionnaire, they had assumed that Squaw Valley merely 
wanted to know the number of sleds that would be entered in the competition, not whether Italy would 
participate at all. Since the Italians did not know for sure in 1957 whether they would be entering only 
one or two sleds in both the two and four man bob races, they had answered only that they would 
“probably” be racing in 1960.27 
Certainly, the Squaw Valley organizers had an interest in knowing how many sleds any individual 
country might send as they were in the process of deciding how large to make the sled storage shed. 
However, it was not at all clear at the time what the Olympic rules required in terms of country/team 
participation for an event to go forward – nor was it clear that the rules applying to the summer sports 
should apply to the Winter Games. The IOC had established a Rule 30, which required a minimum 
number of 12 participants, but that rule had not been followed in Melbourne – or, for that matter, at 
Cortina where neither hockey nor fi gure skating met the minimum number of participating countries 
required of bobsled.28 Because the Rule was apparently not working to defi ne an appropriate level of 
entrants to any competition, the IOC Executive Board at its June, 1957 meeting in Evian, France, dis-
cussed revising the rule while maintaining its purpose.29 As revised, that rule limited inclusion in the 
Olympics to only those sports “widely practiced” in 25 or more countries.30 Even assuming “wide prac-
tice” or a “minimum of 12 countries” was necessary for competition in an individual sport to be held at 
the Olympics, as Godfrey Dewey, President of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, 
noted, team sports had never been required to meet that number. And bobsled was certainly a team 
sport. Moreover, as Dewey reminded Brundage, “The arbitrary requirement of virtual commitments 
from 12 nations two years in advance of the Games as a condition for requiring the Organizing Com-
mittee to keep faith seems to me to be totally unrealistic as well as unreasonable.”31
As various European bobsledders fought the Sofi a decision, the AAU, governing body for bobsled in 
the United States, also began to look for ways to ensure the presence of the sliding sports on the 1960 
program. The AAU’s secretary, Dan Ferris, fi rst asked Otto Mayer to consider moving the races to Lake 
Placid. He also asked whether the 12 nation standard applied to bobsledding because it was a team 
sport. Mayer replied that there would be no bobsledding in New York in 1960, and that the IOC’s Sofi a 
decision required the participation of 12 countries, not teams.32 However, Ferris was apparently con-
vinced that if the FIBT could provide Squaw Valley with the names of twelve nations sworn to compete, 
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the organizers would still be able to build a bobsled run before the Games began. Douglas F. Roby, Vice 
President of the U.S. Olympic committee, also spoke out, advising Alan Bartholemy in December of 
1957 not to consider the matter closed just yet.33 Unfortunately, the arguments of both Ferris and Roby 
were rejected by Brundage who wrote Roby at the end of the year that there simply were not enough 
bobsledders in the world to make bobsledding an Olympic sport. Brundage also rejected the com-
plaints by Count de Fregeolière that there was something “underhanded” in the relationship between 
the IOC and Squaw Valley concerning the bobsled situation.34
Meanwhile the FIBT prepared for its annual meeting in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, scheduled for 
January, 1958. At that point the Federation knew that construction on the bobsled run had not begun. 
They also knew that the IOC had imposed a requirement that they get assurances from 12 countries that 
they would defi nitely come to Squaw Valley. During the meeting, the FIBT and John E. Morgan, from the 
AAU bobsled committee, determined that at least 10 countries wished to participate, including the tra-
ditional powers Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Germany. The FIBT also decided at that meeting to help 
the Squaw Valley committee reduce the cost of construction by agreeing that the Olympic races could 
be conducted at night, eliminating the need to refrigerate the track.35 Apparently, Alan Bartholemy was 
pleased with the FIBT’s offer to hold night races because he wrote to Louis Saint-Cailbre in March that 
he would need to make modifi cations in his plans to allow for an unrefrigerated track. 36 
In the meantime, the FIBT also asked national Olympic organizing committees to let Squaw Valley 
know that they intended to come to the Games. The Italians did so in October, 1957, and were joined 
by the Swiss and the Germans by the middle of April the following year.37 The British, too, sent a letter 
to the organizers explaining that they could not say for certain that they would send sleds, but only be-
cause the committee governing the 1960 British Olympic teams would not be established until 1959.38 
However, Belgium formally said they would not participate, and Brundage reported to Prentis Hale in 
April that he had heard the Canadians would not be sliding.39
At their Tokyo meeting, in May of 1958, the IOC honored their 1957 Sofi a agreement to revisit their 
decision to exclude bobsled. A Squaw Valley representative reported, once more, that too few nations 
had replied positively to their query to justify the construction of the bob run. But at that meeting the 
French delegate announced that he had been authorized by his national committee to say that France, 
as well, wanted to compete in bobsled.40 That would have meant that at least six nations were positively 
on board for the Games, with Britain most likely to compete. But clearly the FIBT had not been able to 
fi nd 12 nations willing to formally commit to bobsledding in 1960, and referring back to the old Rule 30, 
the IOC confi rmed its Sofi a decision.
After that vote there was virtually no chance that Squaw Valley could host an Olympic bobsled 
competition in 1960, but the argument about who was responsible for that result continued. Count de 
Fregeolière wrote Brundage on June 3, 1958, reminding him of how the FIBT had agreed at Garmisch 
to forgo a pre-Olympic test event and to have the races at night on an unrefrigerated track. Given that 
unprecedented willingness to cooperate with the organizing committee’s need to limit costs, the Count 
wondered why bobsled alone had to meet standards that other Olympic sports did not.41 Later in 1958 
he wrote Brundage that he and the FIBT would certainly never have supported Squaw Valley’s bid had 
they not had assurance that there would be bobsledding in 1960. And the Count challenged Brundage 
to explain why he had acquiesced in the matter at Sofi a – was he merely a “servile factotum” for the 
Squaw Valley Organizing Committee?42 Certainly Brundage rejected the notion that he was a servile 
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factotum. He also suggested to the Count that all of his complaints were without merit given the fact that 
the FIBT’s own Vice President,Albert Mayer, had been at Sofi a and had supported the decision.43 After 
that particular exchange of letters the Count de Fregeolière apparently left further negotiations about 
Olympic bobsled in the hands of others.
One group still trying to provide for bobsledding in 1960 was located in Lake Placid. Under the 
leadership of Godfrey Dewey they reminded Brundage that they had a perfectly good bob run in use 
since World War II – at least once for a World Championships. The former bobsledding World Cham-
pion Stanley Benham queried the bobsledding nations if they would come to Lake Placid in 1960 to 
race if they were assured those races would count as “Olympic.” Benham announced in March, 1959, 
that he had obtained promises from nine nations that they would come to Lake Placid under those cir-
cumstances, and fi ve other countries were likely to send sleds.44 Nevertheless, Brundage remained fi rm 
in his opinion that there was simply too little support for bobsled in the United States and around the 
world for its inclusion on the 1960 program. Furthermore, Otto Mayer argued that despite the fact that 
in 1956 the equestrian events had been held in Stockholm, Sweden, rather than Melbourne, Australia, 
no precedent was created for dividing responsibility for conducting Olympic competitions among two 
or more cities. Nor had the recent decision to move the 1960 yachting events from Rome to Naples 
changed his mind. Rather both Brundage and Mayer believed that these exceptions did not alter the 
basic rule that all events in any Olympiad must be conducted within the bid winning community.45
So, there was to be no bobsled in 1960. But why? Clearly the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee 
remained committed to its theory that the cost would be prohibitive and that too few nations would be 
likely to compete were a bob run to be constructed. Yet asking the IOC at Sofi a to cancel the competi-
tion based on that explanation seems inadequate.46 Were there other factors that played into the IOC’s 
decision? Apparently so.
As Avery Brundage was quick to point out on many occasions, the Olympic Winter Games them-
selves had been almost an afterthought, which had never had the support of the Count Pierre de Cou-
bertin.47 As Brundage noted, de Coubertin’s Olympic vision presupposed competitions in sports that 
were – or had the potential to be – widely practiced. Moreover, de Coubertin consistently supported the 
idea that Olympians should be strictly amateurs – a principle to which Brundage adhered until the end 
of his life. Therefore, as Brundage argued as early as 1936, including “professional” fi gure skaters on an 
Olympic program violated the basic ideals of the Movement. Brundage even argued that Sonia Henie 
should be barred from competition at Garmisch because it was “well-known” that she was supporting 
her parents with her skating – and this before Henie went to Hollywood to begin a prosperous fi lm ca-
reer.48 Brundage continued to fi ght the presence of professional athletes in the Olympic Winter Games 
until 1972, supporting the decision to ban the Austrian skier Karl Schranz from the Games at Sapporo for 
accepting sponsorship money from the manufacturer of his skis.49 Since Brundage was convinced that 
the four major winter sports of the 1950s (bobsled, skating, skiing and hockey) were in violation of the 
amateur rules, then it seems possible that he and Chancellor Mayer seized on the chance to eliminate 
the least professionalized winter sport from the program as a means toward eliminating the Olympic 
Winter Games altogether. As Marc Hodler, President of the FIS, told the Zurich newspaper, Sport, he 
had been told by Otto Mayer that if the international winter sports federations were to ask for the abo-
lition of the Olympic Winter Games, the IOC would be “delighted.”50 Later, Brundage expressed the 
hope that the 1972 Games in Sapporo would be the last as with regard to the Olympic Winter Games, 
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“I doubt very much that they will remain.”51 Finally, Brundage agreed with David, Marquess of Exeter, 
in his 1971 assessment that bobsled at the very least should be an optional part of the Olympic program 
because bobsled “clearly cannot claim to rank as an Olympic event … I should have thought that the 
guillotine would have fallen on it in any event under our latest change of rules.”52
Beyond the IOC’s desire to destroy the Olympic Winter Games, international bobsled offi cials had a 
special political challenge to face in 1960. Since the return of the Soviet Union to Olympic competition 
in 1952, the success of their athletes had been pointed to as proof of the superiority of their system. With 
the Cold War growing ever more intense during the decade, the United States and its allies also began 
to see athletic success as one key to winning the hearts and minds of the people of countries, which had 
not yet chosen a side in the ongoing confl ict. In other words, the Olympic Games became another zone 
where the confl ict could be fought in relative peace. Thus, Hungarian anger and frustration at the Soviets 
for putting down their 1956 rebellion was expressed in the water polo pool in Melbourne after it was 
no longer safe to do so on the streets of Budapest. Similarly, the Soviet hockey team’s success at Cortina 
provided another indication that the Communist state was capable of producing a strong set of players 
in a very short time should they choose to do so.53
In the years leading up to Squaw Valley, the organizers struggled to accommodate the demands 
of U.S. foreign policy with their responsibility to open Olympic competition to everyone. Alexander 
Cushing had promised during the 1955 bid process that all athletes, whether or not they came from 
a country with which the United States had diplomatic relations, would be welcomed onto American 
shores. His successors on the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee reiterated that pledge and used their 
political infl uence to gain the State Department’s agreement to facilitate the visa process in 1960.54 And 
when the Games ended, most Americans saw the U.S. hockey team’s victory over the favored Soviets 
as evidence that their country was number one. 
The political problem for bobsled in this Cold War climate was that the Soviet Union had yet to 
develop a sliding sports program. Indeed, the USSR Bobsledding Federation would not be created until 
1969.55 With no Soviet bobsled team in the picture, the Cold War might still have been signifi cant had 
the two Germanies been competing separately. However, both the Federal Republic and the Democrat-
ic Republic of Germany were committed to sending a joint team to Squaw Valley.56 Therefore, when the 
Germans advised that they would like to compete in the bobsled in 1960, there was no chance that a 
German success could be construed as evidence of the excellence of the GDR’s system. In other words, 
when the IOC decided to eliminate bobsled there was no effort by the Eastern Bloc states to change 
that decision because they simply had no reason to care. On the other hand, had Squaw Valley tried to 
eliminate the new sport of biathlon from the program there would surely have been major complaints 
and serious political pressure exerted by the Soviet Union and its allies to prevent that as they expected 
to do well on the skiing and shooting range in 1960.
Although only nine countries sent competitors to the 1960 Olympic biathlon competition, biathlon 
was safe from Olympic elimination because the Soviet Union would never have chosen to give up the 
chance for Olympic medals.57 Although other Olympic sports had in the past had fewer than 12 nations 
competing they, too, were safe in 1960 from being removed from the program. In the end only bobsled 
was charged with being too costly and having too few athletes to justify its inclusion on the Olympic 
program. Constructing a bobrun in Squaw Valley might have seemed to be too expensive in 1960, but 
the long-term costs to the sliding sports are incalculable. Had the FIBT been able to change the Sofi a de-
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cision to eliminate the sport surely more athletes and more money would have been invested in bobsled. 
But the FIBT was unable to do so because of the long-running desire by Avery Brundage to eliminate the 
Olympic Winter Games altogether and because, when the IOC made its decision, the FIBT was unable 
to rely on the Cold War support of the Soviet bloc.
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